Are finance professors to blame for the financial crisis?
So I'm supposed to go speak at Columbia Business School tonight on the topic, "Should finance professors take the blame for the financial crisis?" I just realized a little while ago that I'd better start, um, figuring out an answer. Happily, Jeremy Siegel and Martin Wolf have taken to the pages of the WSJ and FT, respectively, this morning to help me out by giving their takes on finance professors and that most famous of finance professor theories, the efficient market hypothesis.
The answer I glean from Siegel, who coincidentally happens to be a finance professor, is no way:
Regulators wrongly believed that financial firms were offsetting their credit risks, while the banks and credit rating agencies were fooled by faulty models that underestimated the risk in real estate. ... Neither the rating agencies' mistakes nor the overleveraging by the financial firms in the subprime securities is the fault of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
The answer from Wolf is maybe so. Here's how he approvingly sums up the main arguments of a new book by economist/investment consultant Andrew Smithers:
[F]irst, asset markets are only “imperfectly efficient”; second, it is possible to value markets; third, huge positive deviations from fair value – bubbles – are economically devastating, particularly if associated with credit surges and underpricing of liquidity; and, finally, central banks should try to prick such bubbles.
The argument here is that because the folks at the Federal Reserve believed enough in the efficient market hypothesis so as to convince them that there was no point in trying to identify or rein in asset bubbles, we got ever bigger asset bubbles.
Interestingly, Siegel blames the Fed too:
As home prices continued to climb and subprime mortgages proliferated, Mr. Greenspan and current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke were perhaps the only ones influential enough to sound an alarm and soften the oncoming crisis. But they did not.
He apparently sees no connection, though, between this and anything ever taught in finance class.
So here's where I currently stand:
1) There were financial crises before there were finance professors, so the professors can't be entirely to blame for the problems (the same goes for the argument that the very existence of the Fed causes financial crises, by the way).
2) It's possible that we're overstating the importance of academic theories here. If either Greenspan or Bernanke had tried to crack down on the housing boom in serious way, they would have encountered massive political resistance. Ideas matter, but politics matters too.
BUUUUUT
3) Even as narrowly defined by Siegel, the efficient market hypothesis does appear to be wrong. Here's his definition:
The hypothesis does not claim that the market price is always right. On the contrary, it implies that the prices in the market are mostly wrong, but at any given moment it is not at all easy to say whether they are too high or too low.
But Smithers argues that you can identify when a financial market is in bubble territory—if perhaps not with great precision. And here's the thing: Jeremy Siegel believes this too. He wrote an op-ed for the WSJ in March 2000 arguing that tech-stock valuations had gotten way out of hand and were due for a big-time correction (which began that very month). He has significantly tweaked his "stocks for the long run" advice in recent years to emphasize that cheap stocks are more likely to pay off than expensive ones.
4) Siegel's narrow definition of the efficient market is not the one that emanated from the finance faculties at the University of Chicago, MIT and other campuses in the 1960s through 1980s. In those days an efficient market was widely understood to be a market that got prices right, and followed the rules of risk and return laid out in the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Now it's true that even orthodox finance scholars (UCLA's Richard Roll in particular deserves several gold stars here) began poking holes in this elegant structure almost immediately, but the basic message that continued to be conveyed to MBA students, CFA candidates and the outside world in general was something along the lines of EMH+CAPM=Rational Markets 4ever. So I think it's a copout when a finance professor says, "All we ever meant was that markets are hard to outsmart." The finance professors should be asking, "I wonder why so many people think an efficient market is a market that gets prices right and whose risks are easy to estimate? And I wonder if we played a role in making them think that?"
I'll need to come up with more than that for tonight, but this blog post is already long enough. One thing I should add, though, is that Siegel begins his op-ed with a quote from "a piece for the Washington Post" by Roger Lowenstein. It wasn't just "a piece," it was a review of my Myth of the Rational Market, one that was generally favorable but criticized me for being too nice to the finance professors. Then Siegel quotes efficient-market basher Jeremy Grantham, with whom I shared the spotlight in a Joe Nocera column back in June. But no mention of me or my book.
Clearly, my mild-mannered, not-all-that-far-from-the-middle-of-the-road approach is doing me no favors. So that's it: No more Mr. Nice Guy. This crisis wasn't just the financial professors' fault. It was all Jeremy Siegel's fault!
(I'm kidding, professor. Although if you want to write an angry response in the WSJ that mentions me and my book several times, I'm certainly not going to stop you.)
-
1
The hypothesis does not claim that the market price is always right. On the contrary, it implies that the prices in the market are mostly wrong, but at any given moment it is not at all easy to say whether they are too high or too low.
That's the narrowest definition of EMH I've heard - and I think Seigel's being disingenous. Market players tend to treat EMH exactly like it sounds: That the market it generally, usually, if not always, right, and that errors in market valuation are impossible to spot.
This is wrong (or at least, beguilingly imperfect). It's wrong theoretically, where it fails to take into account the predisposition of market players to act on insufficient information, and it's wrong practically, where it ignores the instances where people have correctly identified asset bubbles.
If this is the prevailing view of the market, it's not because finance professors have been toiling away unsucessfully teaching an alternate and more correct model; it's prevalent because it's the model being taught. It's criminally coincidental that just as EMH is implicated in helping brew a major financial crisis, a finance professor remembers that he hasn't been teaching it all along.
-
2
For those who say that central bankers will not have the spine to overcome politics, all I have to say is Paul Volcker in the 1980's.
He is highly respected these days, and Greenspan.....is.......not.
Bubbles are based on psychology and speculation. Last year Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley said oil was going to move to $200 per barrel, and the price of oil started climbing to $147. The price went up $10 in one day, mostly because short sellers had to cover their positions, but the press did not mention that to the general public. Then the price collapsed, but if you really studied supply, and consumption, neither end of the swing was justified. Somebody needs to question the GS and MS guys to find out if they were just making it up, and making money doing it.
Speaking of the price of stocks in the late 90's, most of us were saying the P-E ratios were far out of line. But the press said we were in a "New Economy". The propaganda machines in the housing industry said the price of houses always goes up.
Rational market theory only works if we have rational buyers and sellers working with perfect information, and perfect information means future information as well as current information. So, if I have perfect information, with rational market theory, I could predict the price of oil three months from now, based on what the Nigerian rebels are doing, if the Israelis bomb Iran, etc etc. Which means I could predict all those factors.
Median house price in a market with interest at 5% should be about 2.5 times median income. The price of oil should be the cost of extracting the last marginal production barrel, etc, etc.
When I was studying economics forty years ago, I thought the quants were deluding themselves with complex mathematical equations. Nothing has changed my mind since then.
So, yes, finance professors have some responsibility here, because they sold us on the theory that mathematical equations could predict prices accurately, but....the rest of us were foolish enough to buy it. And use that theory as a crutch to spend foolishly.
-
3
As a recent graduate of a MS in financial analysis program (from the University of San Francisco) and a CFA candidate (on level 3), I have a fresh little insight here.
My professors were a mix of academics and practitioners, and this was a deliberate effort on the part of the program's director to bring both sides of the discussion to the table. The academics told us the theory -- Markowitz, Sharpe, Black-Scholes, Fama, etc -- and the practitioners came in to tell us that technical analysis could work at times, that equity prices were sometimes better understood through mysticism, and that active management has a good case for it.
Also, the first two levels of the CFA curriculum focus on the efficient markets, equilibrium pricing, etc types of models. The third level, then, has several hundred pages of the texts devoted to managing investments in the context of behavioral factors.
Both my graduate work and the CFA curriculum emphasize that the academic work of the last half-century is extremely valuable, but has serious limitations in application. I'm afraid that folks who were running the banks and regulators were not exposed to the same, balanced viewpoint. I do not see how an MBA, even one specializing in finance, or a financial engineering degree can provide the same tools for critical thought that I have received. So, to sum up: I think that finance professors are to blame when they tell their students that the academic views are the way things are without any presentation of the counter side.
-
-
4
[...] Jeremy Siegel vs. Martin Wol&... Share and [...]
-
5
Regulators wrongly believed that financial firms were offsetting their credit risks, while the banks and credit rating agencies were fooled by faulty models that underestimated the risk in real estate. ... Neither the rating agencies' mistakes nor the overleveraging by the financial firms in the subprime securities is the fault of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
-------------------------------------------------
I find it rather awesome that this statement, even using Siegel's incredibly narrow definition of EMH, blatantly contradicts itself.
If you assume that the standard view of EMH (market prices are accurate) is correct, the statement is wrong because the faulty models' biggest fault was assuming that prices were, in fact, efficient and correct.
However, if you ascribe to Siegel's definition of EMH, the statement is STILL wrong because if you can't tell when prices are or are not correct, you can't have an effective model for offsetting risk, since you have absolutely no way to adequately determine what your risk is.
Both the ratings' agencies mistakes and the overleveraging by the financial firms are directly the fault of EMH under either definition. Either a) the ratings agencies and overleveraging were justified because the assets really were worth that much under EMH, or b) since it's impossible to tell what's correctly priced and what isn't, it doesn't really matter what you do, so everything is ok.
Good luck at your deal tonight. I strongly recommend blaming financial establishment/professor groupthink, conformity and don't-rock-the-boatness.
-
6
Efficiency can be defined in three ways.
1. Speculative efficiency (no freelunch): no profits can be made and market cannot be beaten
2. Macro efficiency (the price is right) : prices move according to fundamentals
3. Fundamental Efficiency: 1+2I write an article about Efficiency in the FX market: the basic conclusion in that markets are inefficient in all three forms, especially in the short run.
See
"Through the Looking-Glass: Reconsidering FX Market Efficiency "
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1483493The article aims at overcoming the internal contradictions of market efficiency as defined by Fama (1965) by providing three definitions of market efficiency: fundamental efficiency, macroeconomic efficiency and speculative efficiency. Applied to the foreign exchange market, these definitions lead to multiple forms of efficiency. At each form are associated a set of empirical tests performed at short, medium and long term horizons. Results show that three types of efficiency prevail in the foreign exchange market according to the time horizon considered. The foreign exchange market can thus be characterised by pure inefficiency in the short run (between 1 month and 1 year), speculative efficiency in the medium term (between 1 and 2 years) and macroeconomic efficiency in the long run (from 5 years on). The latest form of efficiency is however accepted with some restrictions. Fundamental efficiency - Fama's definition of efficiency - is rejected at every horizon.
-
7
[...] Finance Professors to Blame for the Financial Crisis? (Time) Finance professors and their famous finance professor [...]
-
8
Here is a somewhat lengthy perspective on the efficient market hypothesis that appears in the OVERVIEW section on my website, paradoxinvestments.com.
In his General Theory (1936) John Maynard Keynes offered a description of investor behavior that many, including Nobel laureate James Tobin, deem to be one of the most incisive commentaries on the stock market ever written. Here, then, are a few remarks from Keynes remarkable essay that address the consequences of investors' woefully inadequate forecasting ability:
“A conventional valuation which is established as the outcome of mass psychology...is liable to change violently as the result of a sudden fluctuation of opinion due to factors which do not really make much difference to the prospective yield, since there will be no strong roots of conviction to hold it steady…The market will be subject to waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, which are unreasoning and yet in a sense legitimate where no solid basis exists for a reasonable calculation… Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so difficult today as to be scarcely practicable.”
Contrary to the above point of view, the Capital Asset Pricing Model embraces the efficient market hypothesis and assumes that stocks are always priced correctly and that their intrinsic values adjust instantaneously whenever new fundamental information appears. Thus, as William Sharpe has noted:
“The key idea behind the theory is that of market efficiency...definition is difficult, but the idea is that...the price of a security will rarely diverge significantly for long from its intrinsic value defined as the certain present value of the uncertain future prospects assessed by a clever, well informed analyst. Market efficiency only requires that currently available information be properly reflected in price...there is increasing agreement that capital markets in the United States are highly (if not completely) efficient”
On the other hand, a key article on the website, “The Defined Future Earnings Model and the Riddle of Perpetual Claims," examines the enormous difficulties that fundamental security valuation entails when utilizing a discounted present value approach -- the classical method for determining a stock's intrinsic worth. Close examination of the DPV approach strongly underscores Keynes' views about investor's chronic inability to arrive at rational, creditable valuations of a stock's long-term prospects which is the essence of what evaluating a share of stock entails. Thus the intrinsic value for a stock ought to recognize its innate status as a perpetual claim on the firm's earning power that gets distributed in the form of dividends or saved as retained earnings. This, in turn, increases book value and the prospect of higher earnings, with rising dividends, over the indefinite future.
Due to the difficulties that a present value analysis entails, a widely used alternative for estimating a stock's intrinsic value is to apply an appropriate P/E multiple to the current (or forthcoming) year's Earnings Per Share. However, this approach, too, is fraught with uncertainty. Thus, as Benjamin Graham, the father of security analysis once noted:
“It is the multiplier of earnings that my students would dearly love to learn about and to calculate. When I tell them that there is no dependable method of finding this multiplier they tend to be incredulous and to ask: what good is security analysis then?"
While estimating future P/E ratios for individual stocks may be compared to astrology, it is equally difficult for the market as a whole. Thus, as Paul Samuelson wryly observed in a 1967 column in Newsweek:
“Although present and probable future corporate profits are admittedly the most important determinant of intermediate market movements, no way exists to determine what is the proper price-earnings ratio. President Hadley of Yale used to say: "God Almighty does not know the cost of moving a ton of freight from New York to Chicago." I doubt that the devil himself knows what is the equilibrium price-earnings ratio on stocks. Fifteen to 1, as Secretary Douglas Dillon once rashly averred? Twenty five to 1? Or 14 to 1, as the tape enunciates now that high interest rates imply high P/E ratios on bond investments. No one knows.”
Thus, it is surely arguable that investors today are no better at setting stock prices at their true intrinsic values than they were in 1936 when Keynes wrote his famous essay on the market. As it turns out, however, the inability of investors (or the market) to determine the elusive intrinsic value for a stock is the Achilles heel in practitioner complaints about the efficient market hypothesis. Thus, for most investors, most of the time, the market is not predictable. Recall that for any selected time period one-half of all randomly selected portfolios will outperform the average (or market) return and one-half will underperform. The fewer the number of stocks selected the more extreme the upside and downside performance for some of the portfolios will be.
Meanwhile, at one time or another, everyone will correctly predict an event that was unexpected by the consensus. The core problem that plagues investors, however, is how to make superior forecasts consistently. For the vast majority the good bets and bad bets (predictions) cancel out and average performance is the result. Thus, we are left with the paradox that an ordinary chimpanzee tossing 30 darts at the stock pages has an equally good chance of outperforming the market as a well trained and/or highly paid professional manager who also selects 30 stocks.
The efficient market hypothesis is correct in its expectation of such a result. But EMH is woefully mistaken about the implications of this -- stocks simply do not sell at their intrinsic values all of the time. In fact, most stocks are mispriced much of the time but the range of plausible intrinsic values is so wide that few professionals can consistently determine if a stock is “undervalued” or “overvalued.” Meanwhile, a stocks price can change dramatically on just a “dime's worth” of information such as a quarterly earnings surprise when reported earnings come in slightly above or below the consensus estimate.
In conclusion, most investors (especially institutions holding 75 to 300 stocks) cannot beat the market despite their considerable skill at performing in depth analyses of the facts, but not of the future. Luck in selection, risk and the accident of timing play too dominant a role in determining performance. Empathetically, however, this is not because the correct price for a stock is whatever the market is willing to pay for it “instantaneously.”
-
9
Justin,
While I don't subscribe to the EMH , I find it hard to accept the assertion that the theory is to blame for the recent credit mess. As a financial advisor working with with individual investors, it didn't take me long to discern that rational thought was rarely exercised in the decisions they made. Despite the fact that EMH is the prevailing orthodoxy in our field and taught in all the course, I suspect most of us practitioners don;t subscribe to it. Your excellent book also helped cement my view.
All that said, my understanding is that EMH is claimed as a characteristic of free markets. Can we honestly say that the housing sector where the great unpleasentness started is a free market? People in charge - gov and corporate partners - made decions, BIG policy decsions, over the decades to promote home ownership at all costs . So we got creative financing, tax breaks for debt, loose monetary policy, etc. etc that introduced all sorts of moral hazard and engendered risk taking.
EMH may have played a part, but to say that it caused this crisis seems like a stretch to me.
-
9.1
Your point about housing is one that I keep struggling with. Obviously decisions by government and by big financial firms played a huge role in creating the mess. But you'd think investors in the market for private-label mortgage securities could have factored in more of the risks. Greenspan certainly seemed to think they were doing so.
That said, I agree that it's quite a stretch to say the EMH caused the financial crisis.
-
9.2
To some degree, these discussions of EMH show some general ignorance and the impoverishment of the collegiate educational system. The fact is, ideas affect behavior.
Four hundred years ago, Voltaire's "Candide" made fun of Leibnitz's postulate that there was no evil ("All things for best in the best of all possible worlds") precisely because it told those in power that whatever they did was "all right".
Leibnitz postulated this in the period directly before the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) with all its attendant horrors.
EMH --as it was commonly interpreted --told those in power that anything they did was "all right" if they were making money NOW.
After all, the market wouldn't "allow" them to make money if it was "wrong" would it? Consequently, Wall Street merrily continued with mortgage securitization, even though many mathemaicians told them the math wasn't right. Why shouldn't they? EMH told them that they must be doing something useful if they were making so much money.
Taken in this context, the postualates of EMH, as generally understood, could be summarized in two words: "Anything goes."
-
-
10
[...] Are finance professors to blame for the financial crisis? (Curious Capitalist) [...]
-
11
Justin and all,
Set housing aside for a minute. Can rational market theory explain the huge bubble in commodities last year? Not just oil, but corn , wheat, soybeans.
The bubble in livestock feed prices caused a lot of producers to get out of the business, causing a disruption to the market for a long time.
Is there a good book, insightful research, etc, as to what happened to cause that bubble, and the subsequent bust? Those prices were headed down before September 15, 2008.....
-
12
New to this forum but one thing that seems to be missing from this analysis is the fact that risk seemed to be removed (or was transferred without the knowledge of the buyers) and therefore any attempt to use "market" forces is moot? How can something be so widespread (everyone can see it in hindsight) but somehow was lost in the moment? This is meant to be efficient? Surely of all people finance professors would be first to see the problem as presumably they weren't swept up trying to fatten their bonus check?
-
12.1
My observation is that finance professors tend to be experts in one portion of finance, yet relatively ignorant of other portions. For instance, my capital market theory class was taught by a professor who was unaware of various financial products and techniques used by real world investors which complicated the presentation of the theory; on more than one occasion, a question about practice was put off and never answered.
From my personal experience and further reading of academic texts, I've come to the conclusion that most academics simply ignore much of the implications of their theories. There are some, on the other hand, who are fully aware of the implications but fail in effectively communicating those implications to end users of theories. Value at risk is a great example of this problem: When VAR was developed, the theoreticians were fully aware that it was not a catch-all solution, but it came to be such in outside use. Likewise, Markowitz and Sharpe were both very careful about laying out the assumptions used in the MVO and CAPM models. If you read the assumptions needed to reach an ideal world under the efficient frontier, they describe a world which is unlike our own.
My personal view is that finance has been represented as a hard science, when it is more appropriately applied psychology and sociology. Financial engineering, therefore, has the same potential pitfalls as social engineering, namely that people learn the system and work to game it.
-
-
13
Justin,
I think the last statement of your blog post here sums up best...(I'm kidding, professor. Although if you want to write an angry response in the WSJ that mentions me and my book several times, I'm certainly not going to stop you.)"
You, like me, and everyone else is trying to make a buck. Housing market: Me, I buy my first house in Jan 2006 (whoops!). But, why wouldn't I. I had been watching housing in northern CA appreciate at a ridiculous rate. I figured, I had better get in. So my new bride and I jumped in, with trepidation, but with the thought that housing is a safe "investment."
And as it has been stated here in the comments, everyone was touting the EMH, but that's the problem it's only a hypothesis and not a truth or constant or some other hard and fast rule.
When it comes down to it the practical person doesn't have the time to deep dive into the quagmire of your economics/finance world and do the hard investigating. They take CNBC and Cramer at face value and make due the best that they can.
I'm new to this financial education and I'm working on an MBA. Hopefully this will help me to understand some of the thinking behind what drives the markets to do what they do, but... In the end (as it is in your blog post) it just comes down to making a buck...
--Wingman--
-
14
Siegel claims that the efficient markets hypothesis just means it is "not at all easy" to beat the market. He is being disingenuous. The (semi strong form) efficient markets hypothesis states that it is impossible to beat the market using publicly available information.
The public policy implications of "not at all easy" and "impossible" are not at all similar. This has been argued for decades by Shiller who can not by any stretch of the vocabulary be described as a believer in the EMH. In particular the implications for regulation are different.
Many extremely eminent academic economists have argued against all sorts of regulation of financial markets on the ground that they are efficient. If the EMH is consistent with bubbles and crashes *and* with financiers who don't have a clue that they are bearing risk, then it certainly doesn't have that implication. The idea that the EMH implies that regulation should be relaxed is not at all a distortion of academic views (in the way that say Laffer certainly did distort academic views).
If the EMH is what Siegel says it is, then why would anyone care about it ? First it wouldn't be a hypothesis -- it is not possible to test the claim that something is "not at all easy." Second it has no practical implications. Aside from public policy, the fact that it is "not at all easy" to beat the market doesn't mean that it is unwise to try.
To avoid facing the falsification of any EMH worthy of the letter H, Seigel has redefined it so that it is unfalsifiable, useless and meaningless. The fact that this is common practice in economics and finance does not imply that it should be tolerated.
-
15
Mr. Fox: I wonder, in addition to chatting with many finance professors who were kind enought to lend their time, did you actually read any of the relevant literature? For example, did you read Fama's 1965 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS article titled 'The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices'? If 'yes,' did you find statements/claims in that paper consistent with your ('not-all-that-far-from-the-middle-of-the-road'??) charge that finance professors in the 1960s-1980s were shilling for the principal-agency and moral hazard abusers in big league finance firms by running around and spouting 'EMH+CAPM=Rational Markets 4ever'? Did you find such evidence in, e.g., Fama's 1970 JOURNAL OF FINANCE paper titled 'Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work'? Or do you believe that, through your terribly comprehensive investigative conversations with these people, you have somehow become an 'expert,' such that you are now qualified/certified to 'report' what others told you to think?
-
15.1
I've read all those papers. And you clearly have not read my book.
-
15.2
Sorry, that was an overly snotty response. Reading my book is not a prerequisite for commenting on this blog. (Although buying it is highly recommended!)
-
But I guess my point is that, yeah, I think that after spending six years immersed in a topic, reading most of the relevant literature and interviewing most of the relevant scholars, I should be allowed to comment on it.
-
-
16
Please don't equate finance professors with EMH. There is a plenty of professors whose research argues against EMH.
-
16.1
Good point. And it's one that was on my list in the Columbia speech.
-
-
17
[...] Are finance professors to blame for the financial crisis? (Curious Capitalist) [...]
-
18
Mr. Fox: It's not an issue of you being 'allowed to comment on' the EMH literature; obviously, your free to voice your views. Rather, conditional on you having read some, among others, of these papers, I don't see the basis for your arguably inflammatory claim that people like Fama, in their scholary work, were effectively saying: 'EMH+CAPM=Rational Markets 4ever'. Call me blind, willfully ignorant, an intellectual moron, or far worse, but, with respect to, e.g., the papers I referenced and Siegel's WSJ op-ed from yesterday, I don't see it. Perhaps I should read/buy your book. Unfortunately, the self-titled 'middle-of-the-road' analysis I see on display here, all else equal, doesn't convince me that the expected benefits exceed the expected costs of that activity. Thanks for your time and consideration.
-
19
And during your talk at Columbia that evening I was dancing at the Park Avenue Armory in Merce Cunninghams Memorial. Lot's of people saying goodbye to Merce and me dancing "The Walking Game" with for the first time in 30 years.
-
20
[...] might say in response is, "Well, I never asserted that." He's probably be right. But as I wrote in my previous post on the topic, what Turner describes was the key message that emanated from academic finance and economics into [...]
- foxjust About to walk to LA Public Library for this http://bit.ly/7LgRu6 Am told only a nobody walks in LA - 1 day ago
- foxjust just took first ride on LA metro. Totally disorienting not to have car to park here - 2 days ago
- foxjust Thanks to Bama fans for reminding us we needed to buy TP! (Turns out we're fine on detergent). Oh, and nice game #ironbowl - 1 week ago
Most Popular »
- Tennessee Mayor Accuses Barack Obama Of Hating On Charlie Brown, Peanuts
- Wii Fit Plus Review
- Obama Shifts Date of Copenhagen Visit
- NV Sen Poll: Reid In Trouble
- The PlayStation Turns 15, We Reminisce
- 'Forgotten Man' II: Two-Thirds of Jobless Blue-Collar
- 135 Money-Saving Resources and Tips, Special Holiday Season Edition
- False Economy: Think You're Saving Money? Think Again
- Twitter App Showdown: Echofon Pro vs Tweetie 2
- Loving The Joke
- How Strong Is the Evidence Against Amanda Knox?
- Will Federal Spending Mistrust Mean the End of Obama's Audacity
- Amanda Knox, Convicted of Murder in Italy
- Nicolas Sarkozy: A French Paradox
- India, Pakistan and the Battle for Afghanistan
- Hate Your Job? Here's How to Reshape It
- Amanda Knox Testifies: The Murder Trial That Has Gripped Italy
- Helicopter Parents: The Backlash Against Overparenting
- Astronomers Spot Planet-Like Object GJ 758 B in Orbit
- Foxy Knoxy Case Still Roils Italy
Quotes of the Day »
RSS