Commentary on the economy, the markets, and business

Are regulators ever going to be good at stopping fraud?

The House Financial Services Committee begins its Bernie Madoff inquisition this afternoon, and the Securities and Exchange Commission is sure to get its share of flack from both witnesses and committee members. Meanwhile, Sunday's New York Times contained an epic tirade against the SEC and other blameful parties (mainly the rating agencies) by hedge fund manager David Einhorn and author/lapsed investment banker Michael Lewis.

I preferred the much shorter diagnosis that Einhorn made in a speech in 2007:

Regulators are good at cleaning up fraud after the money is gone. Government doesn't really know what to do when it catches fraud in progress.

Or, better yet, the verdict of Allan Sloan in his excellent column in the new Fortune:

If commission enforcers get a bigger budget and are treated with respect rather than being dissed (including, I'll bet, by some of Madoff's victims) as an obstacle to free markets, things may improve. But don't expect a fraud-free era to ensue.

I'm saying this not out of cynicism but because I know how regulators generally work. I've seen it for years, in fields ranging from department stores to oil-drilling partnerships. You're likely to get caught if you run a few inches outside the baseline, because regulators are set up to catch that. But run so far out that you're playing on a whole different ball field? You can get away with that if you're enough of a financiopath, and your luck holds.

Regulators are always going to miss lots of frauds in a freewheeling, money-spinning financial system. There is simply no way around that. If you want them to catch all the fraud, you need to have laws and regulations that strictly delineate which financial behaviors are allowed and which are not. In that kind of environment it's easy to see who is operating outside the rules (although clever people will still eventually find ways within the rules to relieve others of their money).

We had that kind of regulatory environment from the mid-1930s through the early 1970s in this country. Then it fell apart—mainly because it was too rigid to accommodate the changes in financial needs wrought by inflation and globalization. Yes, there was an ideological aspect to what subsequently occurred. But simply attributing everything to the Reagan revolution misses that the old system had begun breaking apart long before 1981 with the rise of institutional investors in the 1960s and 1970s, the advent of the money market fund in 1970, the deregulation of brokerage commissions in 1975, and so on.

The new financial landscape that resulted wasn't a full return to the freewheeling, virtually unregulated environment of the late 19th and early 20th century. It was instead an amalgam of some heavy regulated areas and some unregulated ones. The general dividing line was that sophisticated, wealthy investors and financial institutions were deemed capable of taking care of themselves, while retail investors and borrowers were presumed to need help from regulators. But that line didn't hold everywhere--it certainly didn't in mortgage lending. And the Madoff case demonstrated pretty clearly that wealthy investors aren't necessarily sophisticated.

So what do we do about it? Do we return to a system where every financial transaction must be conducted according to rules set by lawmakers and regulators? I don't really see how that could happen--the regulatory system would either have to be global, or the U.S. would have to largely cut itself off financially from the rest of the world. I'm sure we can come up with a better mix of regulation and market freedom than we've got now (I'm sure we could come up with a worse one, too). But big-time frauds will still be with us.

  • Print
  • Comment
Comments (6)
Post a Comment »
  • 1

    Almost by definition, big frauds are the ones the regulators/regulatory regime missed (and allowed to fester).

  • 2

    Do we return to a system where every financial transaction must be conducted according to rules set by lawmakers and regulators?
    _
    yes
    .
    .
    But simply attributing everything to the Reagan revolution misses that the old system had begun breaking apart long before 1981 with the rise of institutional investors in the 1960s and 1970s, the advent of the money market fund in 1970, the deregulation of brokerage commissions in 1975, and so on.
    _
    Few people think the problem started with "the Reagan Revolution", rather Reagan and his "revolution" personified the attitudes that lead to the current disasterous set of circumstances. Reagan, after all, didn't invent the Lauffer curve -- he merely exploited a really lame theory that had been around for a while.
    _
    Ultimately, the only change in the environment that was not the result of 'deregulation' was the speed of financial transactions, and it is because money can be churned repeatedly in mere seconds that even a return to the status quo ante may not be enough. Instead, something must be done to slow everything down, because the entire idea behind "markets" is that they act rationally, and when market conditions can change radically in very short periods of time, the lag time in the distribution of information makes "rational" decision making impossible.
    _
    and the best way to deal with the "regulation" issue is to not merely increase regulations, but to tax transactions -- the fewer transactions that take place, the less there is to regulate, and by making it unprofitable to engage in hyper-fast trading, regulation can become effective once again.

  • 3

    I think it's far too early to begin designing the next regulatory regime that will prevent what's already happened -- it's inevitably the regulatory equivalent of the investing advice, "buy low and sell high." There needs to be better understanding of just what happened, how those events were related to policy choices that were made and how various decision making processes -- both public sector and private -- were flawed, incomplete or inadequately informed. Although the analogy is imperfect in many ways, consider the NASA post mortem (literally) of the 2003 shuttle failure, which has only now produced a comprehensive report of what happened and how. Some changes have been made in procedures in the mean time, but a full accounting takes time. Story at

    http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/31/science/space/31NASA.html

  • 4

    "So what do we do about it? Do we return to a system where every financial transaction must be conducted according to rules set by lawmakers and regulators?"

    The SEC, by its own admission, was shockingly negligent in its investigation of the Madoff fund. And the Fed for that matter, owing to the ideology of its chairman, neglected to curb the excesses of the 'shadow banking system' with disastrous results. Even accounting for the perfect visual acuity of hindsight, it would seem that just plain competence and lack of ideological fervor on the part of regulators would go a long way toward avoiding financial catastrophes.

  • 5

    "So what do we do about it? Do we return to a system where every financial transaction must be conducted according to rules set by lawmakers and regulators?"
    -
    No, but clearly we must remove ideological bias from regulators. Greenspan's put was well-established and known for years. Every one knew it....except for your mom and pop investors.
    -
    Something has to be done to make the SEC a real watch dog. Like I posted earlier and as stated amazingly by Bush, "Wall Street got drunk." We need to find some people with the courage and conviction to take away the punch bowl!
    -
    Finally, it is important to let the public know that this isn't the end of the world or of scams. We should encourage solid investment strategies in companies and vehicles that provide both short-term and long-term gains by unique tax and credit mechanisms. Such growth in wealth and business should be based on real growth not leverage and not phony high-speed financial transactions.

  • 6

    Probably should be clarified that financial regulation is not just about preventing or identifying fraud. It's also about providing incentives for a broad base of prudent and informed market participation throughout the economy. (How's that for a string of bland buzz words?)

    This recent post from Cunning Realist is probably also worth keeping in mind: http://cunningrealist.blogspot.com/2009/01/not-exactly-brain-surgery.html

Add Your Comment:

You must be logged in to post a comment.
The Curious Capitalist Daily E-mail

Get e-mail updates from TIME's The Curious Capitalist in your inbox and never miss a day.

Quotes of the Day »

Get & Share
LORI HAAS, whose daughter was wounded in the 2007 Virginia Tech shootings, on a new report finding that officials warned their families more than an hour and a half before the rest of the campus and released locked-down students who were later killed