In the magazine: Bailout Nation
That article about Fannie and Freddie that I asked for help on the other day is on newsstands now (in the issue with working-men Obama and McCain on the cover) and online here. I really did take the questions asked by commenters here into account as I wrote it, even though I don't think I used any of them verbatim. I was writing the piece for magazine readers who might not have been following this story at all, so I was trying to keep things pretty simple. I will take a look at your questions again and maybe take a whack at answering a few here on the blog. Although the Frannie takeover is already started to seem like ancient history, isn't it?
Anyway, the article begins:
In what is getting to be something of a habit, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson ruined his own and a lot of other people's weekend by choosing the morning of Sunday, Sept. 7, to announce the seizure of money-losing mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Fannie and Freddie are--childish names and all--by far the biggest financial institutions ever taken over by the U.S. government. Their bailout amounts to a stunning return to government control over the U.S. financial system, incongruously led by a former Wall Street boss (Paulson) working in what is purportedly a conservative Republican Administration.
It's also yet another episode in a now year-old financial crisis that shows no signs of abating. Paulson's announcement briefly rallied stock markets around the world. But jittery investors kept running for the exits at Seattle-based thrift Washington Mutual and the investment bank Lehman Bros.--although Lehman's earnings announcement on Sept. 10 sent the stock up slightly, despite the revelation of a $3.9 billion quarterly loss.
Americans not versed in financial-market arcana can be forgiven for scratching their heads at all this and wondering what the heck is happening and what it means for them. Here are a few answers. Read more.
That thing about Lehman stock price being up slightly after the earnings announcement was true when I wrote it a couple hours before the market closed Sept. 10, but it's certainly not true anymore. Shoulda found a different way to phrase that, I guess.
A couple of links: The Brad Setser quote is from this excellent post on his excellent blog about global capital flows, Follow the Money. And the "three California real estate scholars" who wrote a paper arguing "that it was in fact the absence of Fannie and Freddie and their reasonably tight underwriting standards that caused the bubble" are Kerry Vandell and Major Coleman IV of University of California, Irvine, and Michael LaCour-Little of California State University at Fullerton. Barbara wrote about their paper (pdf!) on this here blog in July.
Why weren't those links included in the story as published online? I'll let Scott Karp explain:
The problem is that the editorial workflow for most newsrooms doesn't include a process whereby journalists can collect source links as part of their research process and provide them as work product to be published on the web along with the article.
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Need cheering up?
Check out Brooke Shields' new pseudo-expose on rising childbirth rates caused by the new VW minivan.
http://www.vw.com/routan/en/us/#/video/
Usually these web only vids are really bad, but this one is great.
And Brooke looks great!!
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Justin,
A lot has been written on the "moral hazard" that is generated by the expectation that high risk behavior will not be adequately punished because of government bailouts. To me it seems that "moral hazard" is an extraordinarily mild term to use for something that threatens the international financial system. "Existential hazard" seems more appropriate. Besides, I don't think that reckless risk taking really happens because of the expectation of government bailout. It happens, instead, because short term gains (in salaries and bonuses) amply compensate for the risk of longer term consequences (loss of share value or even liquidation). The real hazard, it seems to me, is that shareholders and the board of directors are unaware of the real risks being undertaken and are unable to control the actions of the executives. To focus on the moral hazard of government bailout (really a fait accompli in today's interconnected markets) is to miss the real problem of inadequate checks on the actions of executives.
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Justin,
A lot has been written on the "moral hazard" that is generated by the expectation that high risk behavior will not be adequately punished because of government bailouts. To me it seems that "moral hazard" is an extraordinarily mild term to use for something that threatens the international financial system. "Existential hazard" seems more appropriate. Besides, I don't think that reckless risk taking really happens because of the expectation of government bailout. It happens, instead, because short term gains (in salaries and bonuses) amply compensate for the risk of longer term consequences (loss of share value or even liquidation). The real hazard, it seems to me, is that shareholders and the board of directors are unaware of the real risks being undertaken and are unable to control the actions of the executives. To focus on the moral hazard of government bailout (really a fait accompli in today's interconnected markets) is to miss the real problem of inadequate checks on the actions of executives.
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Sorry for the double posting!
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>>The problem is that the editorial workflow for most newsrooms doesn't include a process whereby journalists can collect source links as part of their research process and provide them as work product to be published on the web along with the article.
And this is a primary reason why many newspapers and magazines are doomed - their processes are too hidebound and inflexible, and cannot respond to changing times and technologies.
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Justin,
The three Ds—the three legged stool of the prosperity economics since WWII—were: the Dollar, the Debt economy and the Drive of entrepreneurialism.
1. The Dollar offered a stable monitory framework. Its universal reserve currency status based on the Bretton Woods agreement and the belief that “the dollar was as good as gold” made for monetary stability.
2. The Debt driven economy produced a framework in which everyone could profit. It was designed in two layers. Any person or business taking a loan (going into debt) could find creative ways to turn this leverage into profit by producing goods and services that returned more than the cost of the debt. The banks were at the top to manage this leverage of borrowing money. They, of course, made the greatest profit. The banking system utilized the fractional system and monetary inflation controlled by the Federal Reserve to create opportunity for all and made profit in the process.
3. The third leg of the prosperity was the eternal Drive of ingenuity and optimism embodied in the entrepreneurial spirit. Drive was unleashed in the market of opportunities and ideas, supported by a stable dollar, debt and property rights.Suddenly, it appears that the first two legs are breaking down. The dollar status has been shaken. The debt derivatives economy has been stretched to the point where it had no choice but to snap. It snapped like the Yellowstone Fire of 1988. This is the meaning of the Fannie and Freddy government takeover. All of a sudden everyone is deleveraging – trying to exit debt and replace it with cash and the system crumbles.
Why did it take 60-80 years for the big stock market cycle to suddenly change? Active earning and investing life spans usually average some 40 years. One and a half to twice this duration is enough to eradicate institutional memory. That's when the system snaps and the rules of the game shift.
What can the Yellowstone Fires of 1988 teach us?
On August 20, 1988, a day now referred to as “Black Saturday”, gigantic firestorms in Yellowstone sent flames as high as 200 feet into the air. These fires grew so large that they created their own wind. Smoke plumes pushed up to 30,000 feet. Many people, including leading ecologists thought that Yellowstone would never recover or that it would take hundreds of years for its fauna and flora to populate the park again. Here is what scientists learned and what it can teach us about the deleveraging fire storm on Wall Street.1. Expect a lot more pain as a result of the great deleveraging of Wall Street – The Yellowstone fire burned more than half the total acreage of the park. 793,000 acres were affected by fire and bout 300 large mammals perished.
2. The Treasury efforts to contain the crisis will help some come out better but it's overall impact will be limited - The 1988 firefighting efforts included 25,000 people, the largest in U.S. history. 120 million dollars were spent. This huge effort saved human life and property, but had little impact on the fire itself.
3. The natural cycle of deleveraging will run its natural course - The advance of the 1988 fire was finally stopped in September by rain and snow.
4. An amazing new cycle of innovation and opportunities will be unleashed - The Yellowstone fires created a mosaic of burned and unburned areas that provided new habitats for plants and animals and new realms for research.
5. When the deleveraging cycle has finally run its course and everybody is exhausted and depressed, recovery will be faster and stronger than anyone imagines – In Yellowstone Park, seeds released from pinecones took root almost immediately. Lodgepole pine seedlings began to grow at the rate of an inch or two per year. Wildflowers were abundant by the following spring, and the grasses and shrubs were green and flourishing.
6. Certain sectors and businesses will benefit from the deleveraging cycle and will come out on top – In Yellowstone some of the grasses that the elk needs were more nutritious after the fire. Bears grazed more frequently in burned sites than they did in unburned sites. The fires have had no observable impact on the number of grizzly bears in greater Yellowstone. Cavity-nesting birds, such as bluebirds, had more dead trees for their nests. Nutrients from the ash caused the vegetation to prosper and grasslands returned to pre-fire appearance within a few years. Aspen reproduction has increased because fire stimulated the growth of suckers from the aspen's underground root system and left behind bare mineral soil that provided good conditions for aspen seedlings.
7. A major economical shift takes place every 60 to 80 years. This is part of the cycle of life – In Yellowstone, the fires turned out to be a necessary and beneficial part of the natural cycle of life, death, and re-birth.
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