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It's not a subprime meltdown, it's a badly managed hedge fund

Calculated Risk, a really smart financial blog that because I'm a navel-gazing MSMer I only read for the first time last week, had a post over the weekend (link via Barry Ritholtz) mocking the New York Times for explaining away Bear Stearns' hedge fund problems as "fallout from loose lending practices that showered money on people with weak, or subprime, credit, leaving many of them struggling to stay in their homes." (My friend Julie Creswell was one of the offending story's authors, so let's just assume right here that some meddling editor added that line and Julie had nothing to do with it.)

The problem with this explanation is that if it's the loose lending practices that were at fault, why aren't a bunch of other hedge funds at the brink of failure? It's not as if the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Fund and its High-Grade Structured Credit Enhanced Leveraged Fund were the only funds out there buying mortgage debt, after all.

In a post last week I wondered if this was because other money-losing funds just haven't come out of the woodwork yet. Calculated Risk contributor Tanta, "a former bank officer and mortgage lending specialist who is currently on extended medical leave," argues (in backward fashion) that the issue is really that Bear Stearns was running its funds--in particular the Enhanced Leverage fund, which bought its mortgage debt with lots of borrowed money--in wildly irresponsible fashion:

Let's leave, for the moment, the question of the incredibly complex and opaque layers of leverage, synthetic structures, derivatives swaps, and mark-to-model valuations that transformed mere commonplace mortgage loan write-downs into 23% losses of $600MM invested equity in approximately 9 months on a fund created because its precursor fund, which had dawdled along for two years or so generating a mere 1.0-1.5% a month return, we are informed, just wasn't good enough for the high rollers who didn't damn well put their money in hedge funds to earn 12-18% a year. This is really all about a bunch of subprime loans.

In other words, it's not all about a bunch of subprime loans. It's about Bear Stearns, and the investors in its hedge fund. But is it really just Bear Stearns? Somehow I doubt it.

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    "In other words, it's not all about a bunch of subprime loans. It's about Bear Stearns, and the investors in its hedge fund. But is it really just Bear Stearns? Somehow I doubt it"

    Okay, maybe I'm an idiot, but....

    It seems to me that the rate of return on these sub-prime loan funds would have to bear some relationship to the interest rates being charged on those loans, right?

    But there is no way that you can make 18% on those loans, given that the top rate is somewhere around 12% for subprime loans. So the only way to make that 18% is to buy those loans from underwriters who don't really believe that they are going to pay off, and are willing to sell the loans for significantly less than their projected value, right?

    So what we really have is a bunch of underwriters making loans that they think are likely to not merely default, but default in a way that the value of the loan can't be recovered through the resale of the property. And Bear-Stearns thinking that it knows better -- and a bunch of wealthy investors and banks thinking Bear-Stearns knows better too, right?

    Is this about right? That what we have is a bunch of brokers and investors whose avarice overwhelmed their common sense?

    Or is there actually a "rational market" explanation?

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