Commentary on the economy, the markets, and business

Taxing those private equity billionaires (and their little dogs, too)

So Congress may actually take on the big tax break, if you want to call it that, enjoyed by investment partnerships like private equity, venture capital and hedge funds. According to today's NYT:

At the heart of the newest proposal is an attempt to bar private equity and hedge fund operators from a longstanding, but little understood, practice that has allowed them to pay a lower capital gains rate of 15 percent instead of the ordinary top income tax rate of 35 percent on their performance fees, which typically represent most of their annual income.

The industry argues that the portion of profits they receive from investments should receive preferential treatment because of the risk involved. But critics contend that the fees are effectively bonuses because private equity firms have little, if any, of their own money at stake.

This is actually something that's been talked about for a couple of months. The point of the Times article is that it's now suddenly being taken seriously by some people on the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance committees. Last week, Senate Finance top dogs Max Baucus and Charles Grassley introduced a bill that would raise taxes for publicly traded investment partnerships (which private equity giant Blackstone Group is about to become) by treating them as regular corporations. This seems hard to argue against: If you're publicly traded, you're a corporation, right? Except the Baucus-Grassley bill doesn't require that all publicy traded partnerships be taxed as corporations, just those "directly or indirectly deriving income from providing investment adviser and related asset management services."

The logic is perhaps even clearer on taxing fund managers' paychecks as regular income instead of capital gains. But lots of people have been arguing against it--partly out of pure self-interest, partly out of a concern that it will discourage behavior that appears to have been pretty good for the U.S. economy. Venture capitalist Fred Wilson took this on back in April:

[T]o my mind the biggest issue with changing the way VC carried interest is taxed is the unintended consequences. If angel investors who put up their own dollars at risk continue to get capital gains treatment (as they should) and venture capitalists who are investing institutional money lose capital gains treatment, the best venture investors will simply choose to invest their own capital instead of others.

This would mean, I guess, that pensions, college endowments and the like would no longer be able to invest in the best venture capital (and private equity and hedge) funds--and that those funds would make fewer investments. Which would presumably be bad.

The lesson I'm taking from all this is that as soon as you start taxing different kinds of income differently, you inevitably get into really messy situations like this. There's a reasonably persuasive economic argument for favoring risk-taking behavior in the tax code, which we (and lots of other countries) try do by taxing capital gains at a lower rate than regular income. But as soon as you create such a differential, you create a strong incentive for people to try to disguise regular income as capital gains. And it can be really hard to draw a line between the two. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 strove to remedy this by taxing both kinds of income at more or less the same (low) rate. But that didn't stick. So what do we do now? As is so often the case, I'm not at all sure. You got any good ideas?

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  • 1

    " As is so often the case, I'm not at all sure. You got any good ideas?"

    yeah, tax capital gains as regular income, because the lower tax rates encourages people to take risks they would not otherwise take. Its like going to the casino -- only gamble what you can afford to lose, and if you win, you get taxed like its regular income.

  • 2

    You want to put capital formation on a par with casino gambling? If low gains rates increase the potential upside on high-risk and low-risk investment alike, just how much distortion occurs? Assuming you don't want all that big money to go into time deposits, that is.

    More specifically, though, proper treatment of hedge manager profits requires tweaking the code to reflect a new(ish) business and investment practice. Managers' profits interests are most closely comparable to interests for services, and should be treated as service income. Note that the arguments from proponents of the current treatment largely are based in policy, not law.

  • 3

    More taxes are not going to solve anything. That's for sure.

  • 4

    "You want to put capital formation on a par with casino gambling? If low gains rates increase the potential upside on high-risk and low-risk investment alike, just how much distortion occurs? Assuming you don't want all that big money to go into time deposits, that is."

    no distortion occurs -- that is the whole point. The distortion occurs when you start treating some kind of income different from other kinds of income. Its the status quo that is a distortion -- making all income taxed the same reduces the distortion.

    "More specifically, though, proper treatment of hedge manager profits requires tweaking the code to reflect a new(ish) business and investment practice. Managers' profits interests are most closely comparable to interests for services, and should be treated as service income. Note that the arguments from proponents of the current treatment largely are based in policy, not law."

    As long as you have different tax rates for different kinds of income, you will have people finding ways to work the system Just tax it all equally, and be done with it.

  • 5

    Why is simplicity supposed to be the paramount, exclusive virtue of a tax system? Tax is just another feature of the economic landscape. Like the other features, it isn't perfectly regular. Tax loads are imposed by one set of players just as other factors contributing to ultimate return are imposed by others, and the tax system is no less subject to feedback/market forces than those other return components. The impending fight over hedge managers' profits participations is an example of that feedback/market mechanism. This society can afford to have an occasional wrangle about how to tax some newish kind of receipt. People gaming the system and sometimes getting slapped down is the only real alternative to flat-earth statism.

    By the way, my point questioning the true amount of distortion caused by gains rates noted that high and low risk investment generally is taxed the same way. You're talking about something different, taxing investment gain and earned income the same way. I guess you could think of it as a system that taxes all your uses of your time one way, and all your uses of your money in another.

  • 6

    Bravo, Paul and CS! My inclination is toward simplicity, because I resent that our tax code favors full employment for the legal and accounting professions, at the expense of more productive roles. But any changes should tread gingerly, because there is probably a relationship between how we tax various types of renumeration and our resulting behavior. Justin may recall that I made that same point in a previous posting.

  • 7

    "But any changes should tread gingerly, because there is probably a relationship between how we tax various types of renumeration and our resulting behavior. "

    I think that changing behavior is the whole point. Right now, we give favorable treatment to high risk behavior --- not just in the tax code, but in preventing investors from losses in high risk ventures. The recent semi-meltdown at Bear-Stearns is an example.

    Investors were "clamoring" for higher return investments, so B-S started a new hedge fund with $40 million of its own money, $600 million from "investors", and $6 billion in loans. In other words, B-S's exposure in this fund should have been no more than $40 million.... the rest of the risk should have been assumed by the investors and lenders.

    But this hedge fund started sustaning losses, and these investors and bankers started freaking out. B-S had to bail out the fund to the tune of over $3 billion in loans -- and of course B-S's stock price dropped. Someone who had invested in "low-risk" B-S stock thinking that B-S's exposure in the high-risk hedge fund was only $40 million now had stock in a company whose exposure in the high risk hedge fund was $3 billion.

    And here is the explanation for why B-S screwed its "low risk" stockholders....(from the NY Times)

    'Bear Stearns is bailing one of the funds out because it is worried about the damage to its reputation if it stuck investors and lenders with big losses, said Dick Bove, an analyst with Punk Ziegel & Company.

    “If they walked away from it, investors would have lost all their money and lenders would have lost all of the money,” Mr. Bove said. But “if they did that to everyone in the financial community, the financial community would have shut them down.” '

    Now, there is no evidence that B-S was dishonest in its promotion of the high-risk hedge fund... investors and lenders KNEW what they were getting into, and should have been willing to accept the risk of high losses. But they aren't.... basically, they blackmailed B-S into protecting them from the consequences of their own greed -- at the expense of people who were interested in a "low risk" investment opportunity.

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